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Abstract: This study investigates whether the merger of NASDAQ and OMX could reduce the 
portfolio diversification possibilities for stock market investors and whether it is necessary to 
implement national policies and international treaties for the sustainable development of financial 
markets. Our study is very important because some players in the stock markets have not yet 
realized that stock exchanges, during the last decades, have moved from government-owned or 
mutually-owned organizations to private companies, and, with several mergers having occurred, 
the market is tending gradually to behave like a monopoly. From our analysis, we conclude that 
increased volatility and reduced diversification opportunities are the results of an increase in the 
long-run comovement between each pair of indices in Nordic and Baltic stock markets (Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and NASDAQ after the merger. We also find that 
the merger tends to improve the error-correction mechanism for NASDAQ so that it Granger-causes 
OMX, but OMX loses predictive power on NASDAQ after the merger. We conclude that the merger 
of NASDAQ and OMX reduces the diversification possibilities for stock market investors and our 
findings provide evidence to support the argument that it is important to implement national 
policies and international treaties for the sustainable development of financial markets. 
Keywords: Stock exchange mergers; cointegration; Nordic and Baltic stock exchanges 
 
1. Introduction 
The ongoing globalization process and the rapid technological advancements in 
telecommunications and the internet have increased competition in many, if not most, sectors around 
the world. To grow or even survive, some companies have used alliances and mergers to expand 
their activity to other countries. The same is also happening to stock exchanges. Over the last decade, 
the largest stock exchanges began to merge with other stock exchanges around the world. Some 
examples include the Euronext (2005), the NYSE acquisition of Euronext (2006), the OMX merger 
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(2003–2006), the merger between the London Stock Exchange and Borsa Italian (2007), and the 
NASDAQ acquisition of the OMX Nordic stock exchange (2007). These improvements, in terms of 
new technologies and the possibility of remote access, create a favorable environment to invest in 
foreign markets, diversify portfolios, attract new investors, and increase trading volumes [1–3]. 
It is important to say that stock exchanges were created like mutual organizations (owned by its 
member stockbrokers), but some players in the markets still do not realize that major stock exchanges 
have demutualized; their members sell their shares in an initial public offering, and, actually, they 
run the business like a normal private company, trying to increase as much as possible the wealth of 
the shareholders. Examples of some of these movements to private companies are the Australian 
Securities Exchange (1998), the merger of Euronext with the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
(2002), Bursa Malaysia (2004), the New York Stock Exchange (2005), Bolsas y Mercados Españoles 
and the São Paulo Stock Exchange (2007), and so on. The principal question is, after a stock exchange 
merger, working like a private company and not like a mutual organization, do the stock exchanges 
care about the sustainable development of investments, allowing investors to diversify their 
investments and reduce the risk of their investments? Is it necessary to develop national policies and 
international treaties for sustainable development and implement and monitor policies for the 
sustainable development of stock markets? 
A recent study, Otchere and Abukari [4], investigated whether the stock exchange mergers are 
the way for some powerful stock exchanges to become even more powerful in order to get a higher 
market share of stock exchanges around the world, and they concluded that the industry’s 
concentration does not change the exchanges’ profitability during the postmerger period. 
Unfortunately, Otchere and Abukari [4] do not analyze who the shareholders of the stock exchanges 
were, and, most importantly, what dividends they received after the merger. Profits cannot increase, 
but dividend payouts increase. They only analyzed the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), “one of 
the most widely used measures of market concentration”. 
Prior studies have described that stock exchange mergers increase competition between stock 
exchanges around the world [5] and decrease the trading costs based on economies of scale [6–9]. 
Amihud and Mendelson [10], Brennan and Subrahmanyam [11], and Datar et al. [12] also argued that 
stock exchange consolidations help the listed firms to reduce their cost of equity financing by 
improving their stock liquidity, informational environment, and governance on the secondary 
market. Hasan, Schmiedel, and Song [13] provided evidence to show that global exchange merger 
activities may promote the efficiency of cross-border capital flows and increased governance 
standards, and thus, it has the potential to benefit both the markets and investors around the world. 
Although stock exchange mergers benefit the shareholders of the stock exchanges, they do not 
generally help individual investors who prefer to diversify their portfolios to reduce risk. In this 
regard, the motivation of this study is to investigate whether stock exchange mergers can reduce the 
possibility of investors diversifying their portfolios and reducing risk and whether it is necessary to 
implement national policies and international treaties for the sustainable development of financial 
markets. In addition, authors like Rua and Nunes [14] argued that the evaluation of the comovements 
between stock markets is extremely important for investors to assess the risk of portfolios. Thus, the 
findings in our analysis are also useful to policymakers because both shocks and crises can be quickly 
transmitted across closely linked markets [15]. Like in all types of business, having only a very small 
number of stock exchanges around the world controlling all investments could be dangerous. For 
example, the EU refused to allow, in 2017, the merger of the German and British stock exchanges, 
arguing that this would lead to a monopoly. 
The first contribution of our study to the literature is that we find that the effect of stock exchange 
mergers affect the comovement between market indices. In addition, employing cointegration 
analysis, we find that the comovement between each pair of indices in the Nordic and Baltic stock 
markets and NASDAQ increases due to the merger. We recognize that the period of the merger 
concurs with some huge events, e.g., the subprime crises of 2007 and the sovereign crisis. Moreover, 
it might be the crisis that accelerated the process of the merger. Moreover, using Granger causality 
tests, we show that the merger tends to improve the error-correction mechanism for NASDAQ so 
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that it Granger-causes OMX, but OMX loses predictive power on NASDAQ after the merger. Despite 
stock exchange mergers being an “old-fashion story”, the strangest situation is that nobody 
investigated the impact of these mergers for investors. Thus, our paper bridges the gap in the 
literature to investigate the impact of the mergers for investors. In addition, stock exchanges are now 
(and not in the past!) normal private companies with several shareholders who want benefits and 
dividends. Thus, another contribution of our paper is that it bridges the gap in the literature to 
investigate the impact of these mergers by treating stock exchanges as normal private companies with 
several shareholders that want benefits and dividends. Our findings by using mean-variance (MV) 
and Omega ratios show that the merger does not reduce returns, yet it increases volatility by reducing 
diversification. Another important problem is that we move forward (without any investigation from 
academia before) to a monopoly in terms of stock exchanges around the world. This is our third 
contribution to make an urgent academic start to analyze stock exchange mergers around the world. 
The empirical\theoretical contribution of this investigation is to provide evidence to show that 
because stock exchanges are now running like private companies and the biggest stock exchanges are 
merging around the world, the diversification possibilities of stock market investors are reducing, 
and it will be important to implement national policies and international treaties for the sustainable 
development of financial markets. 
Our investigation wants to inform the academics and practitioners about the necessity to further 
explore, in several areas of finance, the impact of stock exchange mergers. The academics from 
finance have already made an amazing investigation on boards of directors, governance, and ethics, 
in several aspects, but it is very strange why the number of researchers that investigate stock 
exchange mergers is so small. What we know is extremely incipient. It is good to have more 
investigations into stock exchange mergers from different angles. 
Section 2 will describe the literature review and research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses data 
and all the methodologies being used in our study. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
2.1. Literature Review 
Essentially, during the last 20 years, stock exchanges have moved from being government-
owned or mutually-owned organizations to being private companies, and it seems that academics 
are forgetting to analyze the impact of the changes from several aspects of finance and sustainability. 
Stock exchanges are now performing like normal companies, and they are owned by private 
shareholders. Despite being private companies, these private stock exchanges decide the listing and 
compliance standards for companies that want to go public. 
If we examine the ownership structure of several other major exchanges, we understand that 
NYSE Euronext is the largest stock exchange in terms of both market capitalization and traded value; 
it went public in 2006 and acquired Euronext in 2007. The Nasdaq OMX Group is the second-largest 
public stock exchange in the world in terms of traded value, and, in 2008, it acquired seven Nordic 
and Baltic exchanges. Tokyo Stock Exchange is the third-largest private stock exchange in the world. 
London Stock Exchange, which is owned by the London Stock Exchange Group, is also actually a 
publicly traded company. 
Based on this information, it is possible to conclude that running a stock exchange can be a good 
business for entrepreneurs. They can then manage the stock exchanges and demand that the 
companies and investors pay listing and transaction fees, respectively, and traders pay to have access 
to the markets. Hence, it is not surprising that big stock exchanges try to buy other small stock 
exchanges in order to control all the fees around the world. Authors like Otchere and Abukari [4] 
recently examined whether stock exchange mergers could increase efficiency or if it is a question of 
market power and found that the industry’s concentration levels have not significantly increased and 
the concentration levels do not influence the exchanges’ profitability in the postmerger period. 
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Although the merger of stock exchanges could affect the shareholders of the stock exchanges, it 
does not generally help individual investors who usually want to diversify their portfolios to reduce 
risk. International portfolio diversification was established in the 1960s and 1970s when the USA and 
other investors became very active in foreign securities markets [16]. Grubel [17] found that investors 
gain from internationally diversified portfolios. Since then, this topic has received considerable 
attention in international finance. International diversification can be beneficial if it reduces the total 
portfolio risk by adding securities based in different countries, with lower correlations. 
Due to the introduction of new technologies and financial market liberalization in recent years, 
it is becoming easier to invest internationally [16]. The literature, however, has not yet shed much 
light on whether stock exchange mergers have had any impact on this process. Up to now, economic 
agents and policymakers have only explored whether national markets have become more integrated 
and what the impact on international portfolio diversification is. This paper, which considers the 
merger of NASDAQ with OMX, represents the first step to investigating the effect of mergers on 
international portfolio diversification. 
According to Choudhry et al. [18], Kearney and Lucey [19], and Chen et al. [20], cointegrated 
stock markets weaken the benefits of international portfolio diversification in the long run. 
Cointegrated assets exhibit significant long-term comovements, thereby lessening their 
diversification potential. Authors like Brooks and Del Negro [21,22], King et al. [23], Longin and 
Solnik [24,25], Lin et al. [26], Karolyi and Stulz [27], and Forbes and Rigobon [28] documented that 
the comovement of stock returns is not constant across the time. Candelon et al. [29] complemented 
this information, arguing that comovement analysis should also take into account the distinction 
between the short- and long-term investors because investors who invest for the short term are 
naturally more interested in the comovement of stock returns at higher frequencies (short-term 
fluctuations) whereas long-term investors focus essentially on the relationship at lower frequencies 
(long-term fluctuations). A’Hearn and Woitek [30] and Pakko [31] also show that the frequency level 
is important when analyzing comovement. However, besides Smith [32], few investigations make 
this distinction. Hassan and Naka [33] argue that portfolio diversification benefits would continue to 
accrue in the short run but not in the long run if markets are cointegrated and that the benefits of 
international diversification might be overstated for investors with long-term investment horizons. 
Charles et al. [34]] analyzed the impact of stock exchange mergers on the degree of informational 
efficiency and found that higher levels of efficiency are less frequent than lower levels of efficiency 
after a stock exchange merger and that the impact on the levels of efficiency is correlated with the 
levels of development, size, and both geographical and industrial diversification of the stock 
exchange. 
2.2. Research Hypotheses 
Our study contributes to the literature on international stock market cointegration by examining 
the impact of the merger of OMX (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; we do 
not report the result for Norway because we cannot find data for the Norwegian stock market) with 
NASDAQ. The main hypotheses tested in this paper are 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The comovements between the merged stock indices increase after the merger; and 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Mergers reduce diversification opportunities. 
Based on the information that we have already described in Section 2.1—stock exchanges are 
merging and turning slowly to a monopoly—we conjecture that comovements will increase between 
the indices and diversification opportunities will be reduced, as stated in Hypotheses 1 and 2 above. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the data and methodology being used in our paper. First, we collected 
data from DataStream. Second, cointegration tests were used to test the long-term relationships 
between OMX indices and the NASDAQ index. Third, causality tests were utilized to test the linear 
causal relationship between OMX indices and the NASDAQ index. Fourth, we tested whether 
nonlinear causalities exist between OMX indices and the NASDAQ index. Last, we compared the 
mean and variance of the returns of the OMX indices and the NASDAQ index before the merger to 
the ones after the merger. 
3.1. Data 
The data used in this study are the daily NASDAQ index and the six Euronext OMX indices, 
including Copenhagen 20 Index (Cop), Helsinki 25 Index (Hel), Riga All-Share Gross Index (Riga), 
Stockholm 30 Index (Sto), Vilnius All-Share Gross Index (Vil), and Tallinn All-Share Gross Index 
(Tal). Data were extracted from DataStream, and the total return index (capital gains and dividends) 
is used after the conversion of all currencies to USD (code “X(RI)~U$”). 
NASDAQ announced the purchase of OMX, the Swedish–Finnish financial company that 
controls seven Nordic and Baltic stock exchanges, on 25 May 2007. As of 27 February 2008, the deal 
was completed. In order to study the effect of the merger in the short, medium, and long run, we 
used the data from around five years before the merger (1 March 2002) until around five years after 
the merger (28 February 2013) of the NASDAQ Stock Exchange with OMX on 27 February 2008 and 
studied the short period (1 year), medium-range period (3 years), and the longer period (5 years) 
before and after the merger. Among the seven Nordic and Baltic stock exchanges that OMX controls, 
we do not extend our analysis to the Iceland Stock Exchange since OMX 15 was canceled in 2008 and 
was replaced by the OMX Iceland 6 index in 2009 due to severe financial problems. In addition, the 
Armenian Stock Exchange, the eighth stock exchange operated by OMX, is excluded from our sample 
because it was purchased by OMX after the announcement of the merger studied in this paper. 
Figure 1 displays the time-series plots of NASDAQ and the six OMX indices from 1 March 2002 
to 28 February 2013. To compare the movements of various indices in one diagram, we adjust each 
index by dividing the price of each index on 1 March 2002 and multiplied them by 100 so that all 
indices start from 100. From the figure, we can make several observations. The movement of the six 
OMX indices and NASDAQ is more homogeneous. The variances of the seven indices become smaller 
after the merger. All the values of the indices go down from the end of 2007 as a result of the global 
2007 financial crisis and recover after the beginning of 2009. Finally, the ascendant trends of the seven 
indices before the merger are obvious, and the movements after the merger are more random. Thus, 
from Figure 1, we can conclude that the merger does have some effects on the stock indices. To further 
explore the relationship, we used a range of different techniques. We describe these techniques in the 
following subsections. 
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Figure 1. Time-series plots of NASDAQ and the six OMX indices. Note: Cop, Hel, Riga, Sto, Vil, and 
Tal represent Copenhagen 20 price, Helsinki 25 price, Riga_GI price, Stockholm 30 Index price, 
Vilnius_GI price, and Tallinn_GI price, respectively. All the price indices equal to spot price divided 
by the base day price (100), which is on 1 March 2002. The red line denotes the date of the merger of 
NADSAQ with OMX. Source: author’s own calculation.,  
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Cointegration 
Engle and Granger [34] proposed a two-step cointegration test that connects the moving average, 
autoregressive, and error correction representations for cointegrated systems. Before applying the 
two-step procedure, we first identify the integrated order of the variables. After confirming that the 
variables being analyzed are I(1), we applied the following cointegation equation to test whether 
there is any comovement relationship between any of the OMX indices and the NASDAQ index and 
whether there is any effect from the merger. 
Y  = δ + δ X  + δ D  + δ X  ∗ D  + ε  (1) 
where  
Considering the potential effect of EU accession by Baltic countries in 2004 and the change in 
reporting regime by listed companies in 2005 (switch to mandatory IFRS reporting by the EU-listed 
firms, we include dummy variables, year, to control the compound effects. Not every panel includes 
the variable year since the sample of the panels does not cover 2004 and 2005. 
In addition, we apply the following cointegration equation without the merger dummy variable 
to test whether there is any comovement relationship between any of the OMX indices and the 
NASDAQ index in the subperiods separated by the date of the merger. 
Y  = δ′ + δ ′X  + u  (2) 
where Y  and X  are defined in (1). If the standardized residual is not rejected as I(0), then the stock 
indices X  and Y  are cointegrated in the subperiods separated by the date of the merger. 
3.2.2. Linear Causality 
After establishing the long-run relationship between any of the OMX indices (Y ) and NASDAQ 
(X ), as shown in Equation (2), we proceed to examine the short-run dynamics and test whether there 
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is any causality between any of the OMX indices and the NASDAQ index by using the following 
short-run dynamic models: 
∆Y  = δ +   α ∆X   
 
   
+   β ∆Y   
 
   
+ γ ∙ ECM    + u   (3) 
∆X  = δ +   α′ ∆X   
 
   
+   β′ ∆Y   
 
   
+ γ′ ∙ ECM    + u   (4) 
where Y  and X  are defined in (1), the error correction term ECM    is the standard residual at time 
t − 1 , obtained by running Equation (2), and the speeds of adjustment γ and γ′ are the coefficients 
of ECM   . Engle and Granger [35] proved that when Y  and X  are cointegrated, there always exists 
a corresponding error-correction representation, as shown in Equations (3) and (4), implying that the 
change in the dependent variable is a function of the level of disequilibrium in the cointegration 
relationship captured by the error correction term as well as changes in other explanatory variable(s). 
The error correction term refers to the level of disequilibrium in the long run relation, while the 
speeds of adjustment represent the proportion by which the long-run disequilibrium (or imbalance) 
in the dependent variable is being corrected in each time period. If we do not reject the hypothesis 
that all α  = 0 and γ = 0, then X  does not Granger-cause Y . Similarly, the failure to reject that all 
β′  = 0 and γ′ = 0 suggests that Y   does not Granger-cause X  . We note that if any of the OMX 
indices (Y ) and NASDAQ (X ) are not cointegrated (that is, there is no long-run relationship between 
the OMX indices and NASDAQ) but both Y  and X  are still I(1), then we still apply Equations (3) 
and (4) to examine whether there is any linear causality between Y  and X  but the error correction 
term ECM    has to be removed from the equations. We note that the causality tests developed by 
Engle and Granger [35] and Granger [36] are powerful. That is why many recent studies, for example, 
Billio et al. [37] and Jin & Kim [38], still apply the tests in their analyses. 
3.2.3. Nonlinear Causality 
Besides classical linear causality, we test nonlinear causality as well. Granger [36] originally 
proposed a novel idea to test the causal relationship between two-time series variables. Using two 
strictly stationary and weakly dependent residual series, u   , u   , which are obtained from Equations 
(3) and (4) and are denoted by x  and y , we can detect the nonlinear causal relation. Following Baek 
and Brock [39], series Y  does not strictly Granger-cause another series X  if and only if: 
Pr  ‖x 
  − x 
 ‖ < e  x    
   − x    
     < e,  y    
  
− y    
  
  < e 
= Pr ‖x 
  − x 
 ‖ < e  x    
   − x    
     < e  
(5) 
where Pr( )  denotes probability distribution and ‖ ‖  denotes the maximum norm. m ≥
1, L , L  > 1 are the given values and e > 0. 
x 
  is the m-length lead vector of x  : 
x 
  ≡ (x , x   , … , x     ), m = 1, 2, … , t = 1, 2, …  
x    
    refers to the Lx-length lag vector of x  : 
x    
   ≡  x    , x      , … , x    , L  = 1, 2, … , t = L  + 1,  L  + 2, …  and y    
  
 refers to the Ly-
length lag vector of y : 
y    
  
≡  y    , y      , … , y     , L  = 1, 2, … , t = L  + 1,  L  + 2, …  
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Let C1 m  + L , L , e, n /C2 L , L , e, n   and C3(m  + L , e, n)/C4(L , e, n)  denote the ratios of 
joint probabilities corresponding to the left side and right side of Equation (5). Correlation-integral 
estimators of the joint probabilities can be written as 
C1 m + L , L , e, n  ≡
 
 (   )
∑ ∑ I x    
    , x    
    , e  ∙ I(y
    
  
, y
    
  
, e)    , 
C2 L , L , e, n  ≡
 
 (   )
∑ ∑ I x    
   , x    
   , e  ∙ I(y
    
  
, y
    
  
, e)    , 
C3(m + L , e, n) ≡
 
 (   )
∑ ∑ I x    
    , x    
    , e     , 
C4(L , e, n) ≡
 
 (   )
∑ ∑ I x    
   , x    
   , e     , 
and 
I(x, y, e) =  
0, if ‖x − y‖ > e
1, if ‖x − y‖ ≤ e
 (6) 
t, s = max L , L   + 1, … , T − m + 1, n = T + 1 − m − max (L , L )  
For the given values of m, L , L  and e > 0, under the assumptions that x  and y  are strictly 
stationary and weakly dependent and satisfy the mixing conditions of Denker and Keller [40], if y  
does not strictly Granger-cause x , then the test statistic is 
√n  
C1 m + L , L , e, n 
C2 L , L , e, n 
−
C3(m + L , e, n)
C4(L , e, n)
  ~N  0, σ  m, L , L , e   (7) 
Readers may refer to Hiemstra and Jones [41], Bai et al. [42–48], and Chow et al. [49] for more 
information on the test statistic in (7). 
3.2.4. Mean-Variance Analysis and Mean-Omega Analysis 
Traditionally, mean-variance (MV) criteria could be used as tools for decision making. For any 
two investments with returns 1Y  and 2Y  with means 1μ  and 2μ  and standard deviations 
1σ  and 2σ , respectively, 2Y is said to dominate 1Y  for risk averters by the MV criterion if 
2 1μ μ  and 2 1
σ σ  when at least one inequality holds (Markowitz (1952)). On the other hand, 
Wong [50] and Guo and Wong [51] define the MV rule for risk seekers such that if 2 1μ μ  and 
2 1σ σ , with at least one strict inequality relationship, then 2Y is said to dominate 1Y  by the 
MV rule of risk seekers. 
MV, however, cannot capture all of the risk and reward features of entire return distributions 
when returns are not normally distributed. The Omega ratio, developed by Keating and Shadwick 
[52], does not require the normality assumption for the distribution of returns. It measures the 
likelihood of achieving a given return, such as a minimum acceptable return or a target return. A 
higher Omega value implies a greater probability that a threshold return will be achieved. It is 
calculated by creating a ratio between the cumulative return probability of being above and being 
below the threshold return, representing the probability-weighted ratio of gains versus losses for 
some targeted return. The Omega ratio is defined as follows: 
Ω(r) =
∫  1 − F(x) dx
 
 
∫ F(x)dx
 
  
  
where r is the threshold return and F is the cumulative density function of returns. 
Since the Omega ratio is the ratio between the expected return in excess of the threshold and the 
first-order lower partial moment, it is also a risk measure using the first-order lower-partial moment. 
Compared to MV, the Omega ratio considers all moments and is consistent with stochastic 
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dominance [46,53]. We employ it as a measure to compare portfolios before and after the merger. 
Readers may refer to the following authors for more information: Chow et al [54] on the Omega ratio 
and stochastic dominance; Chan et al. [55] for the relationship between stochastic dominance and the 
extension of the mean-variance rule; Ma and Wong [56] Niu, Wong, and Xu [57], Guo, Niu, and Wong 
[58], and others for the relationship between stochastic dominance and other risk measures. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Before analyzing the relationship between any of the six OMX indices and the NASDAQ index, 
we first examined the nature of the indices and exhibit in Table 1 (Panel A/B/C) some basic statistics 
of the daily stock prices and returns of the indices. The indices include the NASDAQ and the six 
OMX indices for the periods of one/three/five years (reported in A/B/C panel) before and after the 
merger of OMX with NASDAQ on 27 February 2008. For easy comparison, we also report the 
statistics for the combined periods (combining the periods before and after the merger). From the 
table, we find that except for Tal and NASDAQ in Panel B, the means of all the stock returns studied 
in this paper are higher before the merger than after the merger in all panels. We also find that the 
standard deviations of the stock returns of all the indices studied in this paper are smaller before the 
merger than after the merger in all three panels. The highest values of all indices appear before the 
merger except for Cop and NASDAQ in Panel C. However, the greatest returns of each index appear 
after the merger. On the other hand, the minimum prices of each index appear after the merger for 
Panels A and B. For Panel C, the minimum prices of Cop, Hel, Sto, Vil, and Tal indices appear before 
the merger and those of Riga and NASDAQ indices appear after the merger. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the price index and return of the stock index. 
Panel A: One Year Before and/or After Stock Exchange Merger 
 Variable N Mean Min Max Std.Dev 
   Price 
Retur
n 
Price 
Retur
n 
Price 
Retur
n 
Price Return 
Combi
ned 
Cop 419 415.087 −0.163 233.945 
−11.72
1 
517.671 10.586 86.473 2.182 
 Hel 419 2603.797 −0.204 1254.775 −8.906 3379.03 9.286 
651.03
9 
2.153 
 Riga 419 547.645 −0.262 210.556 −9.738 764.497 9.157 
161.80
6 
1.766 
 Sto 419 988.065 −0.142 567.613 −7.512 1311.872 11.066 
228.71
4 
2.244 
 Vil 419 423.762 −0.27 161.268 −9.111 591.436 11.001 
129.82
6 
1.759 
 Tal 419 656.521 −0.277 260.189 −7.046 991.611 7.603 
233.17
8 
1.64 
 NASDAQ 419 2291.399 −0.123 1316.12 −9.588 2859.12 11.159 
417.94
3 
2.242 
Before Cop 210 478.490 −0.053 391.124 −6.699 517.671 3.744 26.350 1.336 
 Hel 210 3129.462 −0.048 2503.433 −4.797 3379.030 6.916 
169.78
2 
1.419 
 Riga 210 681.379 −0.094 535.159 −9.738 764.497 4.386 52.839 1.285 
 Sto 210 1182.711 −0.095 921.284 −4.133 1311.872 3.965 91.379 1.446 
 Vil 210 524.096 −0.035 452.761 −6.533 591.436 3.144 34.037 1.083 
 Tal 210 860.223 −0.141 627.225 −6.112 991.611 3.134 89.380 1.166 
 NASDAQ 210 2582.087 −0.005 2292.270 −3.839 2859.120 3.406 
121.94
1 
1.249 
After Cop 209 351.381 −0.274 233.945 
−11.72
1 
468.661 10.586 78.694 2.783 
 Hel 209 2075.618 −0.360 1254.775 −8.906 2939.774 9.286 
513.34
1 
2.692 
 Riga 209 413.271 −0.431 210.556 −7.859 543.192 9.157 
116.65
5 
2.134 
 Sto 209 792.487 −0.190 567.613 −7.512 1036.856 11.066 
141.58
8 
2.831 
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 Vil 209 322.949 −0.507 161.268 −9.111 468.460 11.001 
111.04
9 
2.219 
 Tal 209 451.845 −0.413 260.189 −7.046 641.255 7.603 
131.34
7 
2.001 
 NASDAQ 209 1999.320 −0.241 1316.120 −9.588 2533.730 11.159 
406.27
5 
2.916 
Panel B: Three Years Before and/or After Stock Exchange Merger 
 Variable N Mean Min Max Std.Dev 
   Price 
Retur
n 
Price 
Retur
n 
Price 
Retur
n 
Price Return 
Combi
ned 
Cop 1336 386.488 0.028 213.113 
−11.72
1 
517.671 10.586 68.585 1.59 
 Hel 1336 2354.08 0.021 1189.091 −8.906 3379.03 9.286 
512.89
2 
1.657 
 Riga 1336 483.633 0.008 203.157 −9.738 764.497 10.18 
157.43
3 
1.591 
 Sto 1336 969.304 0.028 567.613 −7.512 1311.872 11.066 
166.66
7 
1.657 
 Vil 1336 381.602 0.013 149.964 −9.111 591.436 11.001 
110.11
6 
1.435 
 Tal 1336 609.36 0.025 244.991 −7.046 1043.29 12.095 
185.54
5 
1.404 
 NASDAQ 1336 2232.037 0.026 1268.64 −9.588 2859.12 11.159 
316.36
6 
1.606 
Before Cop 668 412.257 0.040 306.250 −6.699 517.671 3.744 57.410 1.090 
 Hel 668 2635.243 0.048 1852.999 −4.797 3379.030 6.916 
439.97
7 
1.154 
 Riga 668 613.890 0.041 422.915 −9.738 764.497 4.929 83.356 1.121 
 Sto 668 1027.044 0.031 748.240 −4.882 1311.872 5.349 
154.57
7 
1.205 
 Vil 668 459.814 0.046 335.853 −6.533 591.436 4.216 61.528 1.051 
 Tal 668 735.038 0.024 534.855 −6.112 1043.290 5.569 
127.18
5 
0.959 
 NASDAQ 668 2329.348 0.023 1904.180 −3.936 2859.120 4.366 
220.08
0 
1.027 
After Cop 668 360.718 0.015 213.113 
−11.72
1 
475.021 10.586 69.200 1.968 
 Hel 668 2072.916 −0.005 1189.091 −8.906 2939.774 9.286 
417.83
7 
2.040 
 Riga 668 353.377 −0.025 203.157 −7.859 543.192 10.180 93.140 1.952 
 Sto 668 911.565 0.025 567.613 −7.512 1179.295 11.066 
158.19
4 
2.011 
 Vil 668 303.391 −0.019 149.964 −9.111 468.460 11.001 90.727 1.736 
 Tal 668 483.683 0.026 244.991 −7.046 786.422 12.095 
145.23
3 
1.740 
 NASDAQ 668 2134.725 0.030 1268.640 −9.588 2833.950 11.159 
364.58
4 
2.027 
Panel C: Five Years Before and After Stock Exchange Merger 
 Variable N Mean Min Max Std.Dev 
   Price 
Retur
n 
Price 
Retur
n 
Price Return Price Return 
Combi
ned 
Cop 2273 370.602 0.047 169.04 −11.72 556.876 10.586 87.817 1.417 
 Hel 2273 2141.021 0.031 1100.381 −8.906 3379.03 9.286 525.714 1.579 
 Riga 2273 429.502 0.032 203.157 −9.738 764.497 10.18 142.039 1.351 
 Sto 2273 918.075 0.041 432.36 −7.512 1311.872 11.066 200.033 1.546 
 Vil 2273 336.379 0.06 92.385 −11.94 591.436 11.001 115.546 1.289 
 Tal 2273 556.602 0.057 204.11 −7.046 1043.29 12.095 191.942 1.29 
 NASDAQ 2273 2284.257 0.04 1268.64 −9.588 3213.59 11.159 423.65 1.484 
Before Cop 1141 346.173 0.073 169.040 −6.699 517.671 3.744 92.067 1.031 
 Hel 1141 2181.587 0.074 1100.381 −4.797 3379.030 6.916 649.357 1.090 
 Riga 1141 488.304 0.087 203.730 −9.738 764.497 4.967 166.237 1.034 
 Sto 1141 867.496 0.062 432.360 −4.882 1311.872 5.349 229.725 1.186 
 Vil 1141 350.069 0.140 92.385 −6.533 591.436 4.536 143.311 1.016 
 Tal 1141 563.974 0.099 204.110 −6.112 1043.290 7.179 230.223 0.979 
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 NASDAQ 1141 2140.534 0.051 1278.370 −3.936 2859.120 4.698 311.455 1.113 
After Cop 1132 395.226 0.022 213.113 −11.72 556.876 10.586 75.757 1.720 
 Hel 1132 2100.132 −0.012 1189.091 −8.906 2939.774 9.286 356.147 1.951 
 Riga 1132 370.232 −0.024 203.157 −7.859 543.192 10.180 75.298 1.606 
 Sto 1132 969.056 0.020 567.613 −7.512 1205.099 11.066 148.338 1.839 
 Vil 1132 322.579 −0.021 149.964 −11.94 468.460 11.001 75.754 1.512 
 Tal 1132 549.172 0.016 244.991 −7.046 786.422 12.095 143.088 1.540 
 NASDAQ 1132 2429.122 0.029 1268.640 −9.588 3213.590 11.159 470.027 1.781 
Note: Data was extracted from DataStream. Cop, Hel, Riga, Sto, Vil, and Tal represent Copenhagen 
20 price, Helsinki 25 price, Riga_GI price, Stockholm 30 index price, Vilnius_GI price, and Tallinn_GI 
price, respectively. Source: author’s own calculation, using Eviews software. 
4.1. Cointegration 
Before applying the cointegration tests, we first employed the Philips–Perron (PP) unit-root test 
to examine the stationarity property of the variables for the periods of 1/3/5 years before and after the 
merger of OMX with NASDAQ, exclusively and inclusively. We report in Table 2 the stationarity 
status for each series on both level and first differences. The table shows that all the price series 
involved do not reject the null hypothesis that the series has a unit root at the 10% level but reject the 
null hypothesis at the 1% significant level after the first difference, implying that all the indices are 
I(1) in the subperiods before and after the merger and in the entire combined period. This meets the 
nonstationarity requirement for the establishment of the cointegration relationship. 
Table 2. Unit-root tests for the levels and differences of stock price series. 
  1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 
Period Series Level Difference Level Difference Level Difference 
Combined Cop 0.4441 0.0000 *** 0.8336 0.0000 *** 0.6700 0.0000 *** 
 Hel 0.3379 0.0000 *** 0.8423 0.0000 *** 0.7536 0.0000 *** 
 Riga 0.8161 0.0000 *** 0.7443 0.0000 *** 0.7240 0.0000 *** 
 Sto 0.1117 0.0000 *** 0.8280 0.0000 *** 0.5850 0.0000 *** 
 Vil 0.8489 0.0000 *** 0.7849 0.0000 *** 0.6566 0.0000 *** 
 Tal 0.1743 0.0000 *** 0.8936 0.0000 *** 0.8278 0.0000 *** 
 NASDAQ 0.7209 0.0000 *** 0.8750 0.0000 *** 0.4624 0.0000 *** 
Before Cop 0.8858 0.0000 *** 0.8370 0.0000 *** 0.7094 0.0000 *** 
 Hel 0.7040 0.0000 *** 0.8615 0.0000 *** 0.5135 0.0000 *** 
 Riga 0.9930 0.0000 *** 0.7863 0.0000 *** 0.3295 0.0000 *** 
 Sto 0.5533 0.0000 *** 0.7841 0.0000 *** 0.7780 0.0000 *** 
 Vil 0.9969 0.0000 *** 0.8134 0.0000 *** 0.4094 0.0000 *** 
 Tal 0.9385 0.0000 *** 0.7034 0.0000 *** 0.7734 0.0000 *** 
 NASDAQ 0.8846 0.0000 *** 0.7995 0.0000 *** 0.7933 0.0000 *** 
After Cop 0.4228 0.0000 *** 0.9519 0.0000 *** 0.8075 0.0000 *** 
 Hel 0.2001 0.0000 *** 0.9588 0.0000 *** 0.4073 0.0000 *** 
 Riga 0.5115 0.0000 *** 0.9136 0.0000 *** 0.2455 0.0000 *** 
 Sto 0.2985 0.0000 *** 0.9115 0.0000 *** 0.7812 0.0000 *** 
 Vil 0.8570 0.0000 *** 0.9416 0.0000 *** 0.3187 0.0000 *** 
 Tal 0.7969 0.0000 *** 0.8616 0.0000 *** 0.7418 0.0000 *** 
 NASDAQ 0.2925 0.0000 *** 0.9289 0.0000 *** 0.8401 0.0000 *** 
This table reports p-values of unit-root tests for the level and differences of stock price series. *** 
denotes the significance of PP tests at 1% level. Source: author’s own calculation. 
We turn to examine whether there is any cointegration relationship in the first, third, and fifth 
years, before and after the merger and in the combined periods. We report the results of the 
cointegration model stated in Equation (1) for the combined periods in Table 3. The compound effects 
have been controlled as well. From Table 3, we find that the p-values of PP tests of the residuals after 
fitting the cointegration equation stated in (1) are all smaller than 1%. The results imply that there is 
a cointegrated relationship between all of the six OMX indices and the NASDAQ index. In other 
words, we can conclude that there is a common stochastic long-term trend between each of the OMX 
indices and the NASDAQ index over the entire period after the dummy variable of the merger is 
included. 
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Table 3. Estimation of cointegration tests using the daily price index of OMX with a dummy variable. 
 Cointegration between NASDAQ and OMX 
            f-Test PP 
1 year 
Cop 52.5514 ** 0.1650 *** −84.8132 *** 0.0269 *** 41.36 *** 0.0000 *** 
Hel 487.9849 *** 1.0230 *** −858.0576 *** 0.2003 *** 224.48 *** 0.0001 *** 
Riga 111.3546 * 0.2208 *** −245.0116 *** 0.0528 ** 201.28 *** 0.0009 *** 
Sto 486.7593 *** 0.2695 *** −359.9789 *** 0.0634 236.27 *** 0.0073 *** 
Vil −9.1745 0.2065 *** −201.9048 *** 0.0606 *** 125.68 *** 0.0000 *** 
Tal 471.4097 *** 0.1506 *** −645.3527 *** 0.1624 *** 342.62 *** 0.0043 *** 
3 year 
Cop −115.0172 *** 0.2284 *** 91.5413 *** −0.049 *** 4278.63 *** 0.0000 *** 
Hel −704.4742 *** 1.4719 *** 524.1054 *** −0.418 *** 4937.93 *** 0.0000 *** 
Riga 71.8514 ** 0.2392 *** −80.2937 ** −0.070 *** 2102.27 *** 0.0008 *** 
Sto −95.5730 *** 0.4948 *** 160.3319 *** −0.099 *** 2403.82 *** 0.0004 *** 
Vil −242.3399 *** 0.2953 *** 89.3141 *** −0.082 *** 2310.10 *** 0.0000 *** 
Tal −355.3489 *** 0.4683 *** 38.9749 −0.093 *** 2404.94 *** 0.0000 *** 
5 year 
Cop −191.8298 *** 0.2570 *** 221.8092 *** −0.106 *** 4610.03 *** 0.0000 *** 
Hel −1489.181 *** 1.7700 *** 2495.85 *** −1.320 *** 1818.72 *** 0.0005 *** 
Riga −424.1897 *** 0.4347 *** 571.373 *** −0.343 *** 1964.28 *** 0.0002 *** 
Sto −462.3664 *** 0.6365 *** 764.942 *** −0.362 *** 3120.89 *** 0.0001 *** 
Vil −469.9011 *** 0.3834 *** 518.698 *** −0.271 *** 2086.51 *** 0.0000 *** 
Tal −688.0900 *** 0.5953 *** 571.282 *** −0.321 *** 2490.92 *** 0.0000 *** 
We exclude the period of 1 February 2008 to 31 March 2008 since the effect of the merger may have 
begun before or after the date of merger as the result of different expectations of the merger date in 
different markets. Iceland is excluded as well due to complicated financial problems during the ten 
analyzed periods.     is a dummy variable equal to 1 if time is after the merger date. Six OMX indices 
are regarded as dependent variables, and the NASDAQ index is regarded as an independent variable. 
Dummy variable      is included to control compound effects. The p-values of PP tests are reported 
in this table. *, **, and *** denote the significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Source: 
author’s own calculation. Y  = δ + δ X  + δ D  + δ X  ∗ D  + year + ε . 
In addition, we find that except for the intercept for Vil in the short-run (one year before and 
after the merger), which is insignificant, all other estimates of both the intercepts and the slopes are 
significant for the short, medium, and long runs. Moreover, except for the short-run Vil, which is 
negative, all other intercepts are positive in the short run. They become negative in the medium run 
and more negative in the long run. On the other hand, the slope coefficients are all positive, implying 
that each of the OMX indices and the NASDAQ index are moving in the same direction. In addition, 
we find that except for the slope for Hel, which is larger in the medium run than in the long run, for 
all other slopes, the longer the time period being tested, the larger the values become. These findings 
imply that, in general, the positive relationship between each of the OMX indices and NASDAQ index 
is stronger in the long run than in the short run. 
We then looked into the effects of the control merger dummy D   on the cointegration 
relationship in Equation (1). To do so, we examined the estimates of both δ  and δ . From Table 3, 
we find that all estimates of δ   except Sto are statistically significant. Briefly, 1-year Riga is 
significant at the 5% significant level and all the others at the 1% level. All estimates of δ   are 
statistically significant at the 1% level except for 3-year Tal. The implication is that the control merger 
dummy D  strongly affects both the intercept and the slope of the cointegration model in (1). The 
results also imply that the long-run linear relationships between each OMX index and the NASDAQ 
Index change after the merger, irrespective of the sample time period in question. When we check 
the signs of the estimates of δ  and δ  for different periods, we find the following two interesting 
results: (1) The estimates of δ  are all significantly positive in the period one year before the merger 
to one year after the merger. All become significantly negative in the periods of three and five years 
before and after the merger. The absolute values of the coefficients are larger for the five-year periods 
than for the three-year periods. (2) On the other hand, the estimates of δ   are all significantly 
negative in the period one year before the merger to one year after the merger. Except for Riga, the 
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estimates of δ  become significantly positive in the period of three years before the merger to three 
years after the merger. For the period of five years before and after the merger, the estimates of δ  
are all significantly positive and larger than the three-year before-and-after periods. 
The first finding implies that the merger has a positive effect on the comovement of the OMX 
indices and NASDAQ in the short run (one year before to one year after the merger). In the medium 
run (3 years before and after), the effect is negative and becomes more pronounced in the longer run 
(5 years before and after). The second finding implies that the merger has a negative effect on the 
OMX indices in the short run. In the medium run, the effect is positive and becomes more pronounced 
in the longer run. Taken together, the two findings suggest strong short-run diversification effects 
that are reversed and exacerbated as the sample period increases. 
To further investigate the impact of the merger on the integration between the OMX indices and 
NASDAQ, we estimated the cointegration model stated in Equation (2) on separate samples and 
report the results in Table 4. Since the conclusion drawn from the results of Table 4 should be similar 
to those from Table 3, we only report the results that Table 3 cannot reveal. 
Table 4. Estimation of the cointegration test using the subperiod daily price index of OMX. 
 Before the Merger After the Merger 
  ′   ′ PP  ′   ′ PP 
1 year 
Cop 52.5514 ** 0.1650 *** 0.1487 −32.2618 *** 0.1919 *** 0.0000 *** 
Hel 487.9849 *** 1.0230 *** 0.1243 −370.0727 *** 1.2233 *** 0.0037 *** 
Riga 111.3546 * 0.2208 *** 0.2493 −133.6570 *** 0.2736 *** 0.0055 *** 
Sto 486.7593 *** 0.2695 *** 0.7736 126.7804 *** 0.3330 *** 0.0013 *** 
Vil −9.1745 0.2065 *** 0.0110 ** −211.0793 *** 0.2671 *** 0.0000 *** 
Tal 471.4097 *** 0.1506 *** 0.8402 −173.9431 *** 0.3130 *** 0.0002 *** 
3 year 
Cop −170.2508 *** 0.2501 *** 0.0000 *** −24.5914 *** 0.1805 *** 0.0010 *** 
Hel −1740 *** 1.8785 *** 0.0024 *** −212.3361 *** 1.0705 *** 0.0014 *** 
Riga −100.5118 *** 0.3067 *** 0.0062 *** −15.8479 0.1730 *** 0.0280 ** 
Sto −441.8336 *** 0.6306 *** 0.0487 ** 55.4960 *** 0.4010 *** 0.0343 ** 
Vil −72.1086 *** 0.2284 *** 0.0039 *** −161.5694 *** 0.2178 *** 0.0032 *** 
Tal −355.9487 *** 0.4684 *** 0.0497 ** −307.5832 *** 0.3707 *** 0.0005 *** 
5 year 
Cop −251.2215 *** 0.2791 *** 0.0010 *** 33.8308 *** 0.1488 *** 0.0087 *** 
Hel −2015 *** 1.9608 *** 0.0009 *** 994.3418 *** 0.4552 *** 0.0106 ** 
Riga −528.6675 *** 0.4751 *** 0.0083 *** 143.3833 *** 0.0934 ** 0.0058 *** 
Sto −608.9909 *** 0.6898 *** 0.0063 *** 304.4105 *** 0.2736 *** 0.0402 ** 
Vil −526.5326 *** 0.4095 *** 0.0088 *** 45.1471 *** 0.1142 *** 0.0051 *** 
Tal −839.2157 *** 0.6555 *** 0.0098 *** −112.1704 *** 0.2723 *** 0.0036 *** 
This table reports the results of cointegration tests using subsamples—one, three, and five years before 
and after the merger of NASDAQ with OMX. The p-values of PP tests are reported in this table. Six 
OMX indices are regarded as dependent variables and the NASDAQ index is regarded as an 
independent variable. *, **, and *** denote the significance of tests at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Source: author’s own calculation. Y  = δ′ + δ ′X  + u . 
The most striking results from Equation (2) that Equation (1) cannot reveal is that except for Vil, 
none of the OMX indices are cointegrated with NASDAQ in the one-year short-run period before the 
merger, but all become cointegrated after the merger, implying that the merger of NASDAQ and 
OMX becomes more sustainable. In the medium/long run, all OMX indices are cointergrated with the 
NASDAQ index before and after the merger at or above the 5% significant level. 
We turn to examine the impact of the merger on the intercept and slope. We first examined the 
intercept coefficients (δ′). We find that with the exception of Vil, the intercepts are all positive, and, 
with the exception of Sto, all become negative in the short run after the merger. On the other hand, 
in the median run, the intercepts are all negative before the merger. They remain negative after the 
merger but with considerably smaller absolute values. All are strongly negative in the long run before 
the merger and, except for Tal, become strongly positive. 
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Comparing the coefficients of slopes before the merger in Table 3 with the coefficients of slopes 
(δ ′) in Table 4 and the coefficients of slopes (δ ′) after the merger, all become larger in the short run 
but become smaller in the median run and become further smaller in the long run. This finding is 
also consistent with the results that the merger had a positive effect on the comovement of the OMX 
indices and NASDAQ in the short run but a negative effect on the comovement of the OMX indices 
and NASDAQ in a median period and a more negative effect in the long run. 
In all, we conclude that OMX indices and the NASDAQ index have a positive common trend, 
and the comovement between them enlarges after the merger in the short run but diminishes in the 
long run. The OMX Exchange operates eight stock exchanges, mainly in the Nordic and Baltic 
countries, while NASDAQ is mainly in the USA. Before the merger, OMX and NASDAQ were mainly 
influenced by their local financial issues in the short run. This could be the reason why these two 
exchanges were not cointegrated in the short run. Meanwhile, financial markets are linked with each 
other nowadays, and, then, two long-distance markets may be cointegrated with each other in the 
long run if affected by a similar global financial environment. However, after the merger, OMX and 
NASDAQ became one company and were cointegrated even in the short run. Our finding implies 
that the merger of NASDAQ and OMX becomes more sustainable. 
4.2. Linear Causality 
Since all variables are I(1), and there is cointegration between all OMX indices and the NASDAQ 
index except at one year before the merger, we next employ an error-correction model (ECM; Engle 
and Granger, [34]) to test whether there is any unidirectional or bidirectional relationship between 
the NASDAQ and OMX indices. The main results of the Granger causality test are reported in Tables 
5 and 6, including the estimated speeds of adjustment. The null hypothesis of Table 5 is that NASDAQ 
does not Granger-cause OMX indices, while the null hypothesis of Table 6 is that OMX indices do 
not Granger-cause the NASDAQ index. 
According to Table 5, all the statistics of the F-test are significant at the 1% level, implying that 
the NASDAQ index Granger causes the OMX indices both before and after the merger, no matter 
how long the time period is. When we further assess the effect of the merger and estimate the speeds 
of adjustment, we find that the estimates of the error correction mechanism (γ) for NASDAQ causing 
OMX (except Vil) are not significant one year before the merger. Five out of seven become significant 
one year after the merger. Only two of γ are significant in the medium run before the merger, but all 
except Sto become significant after the merger. None of the γ are significant in the long run before 
the merger, but 5 out of 7 become significant at or above 5% after the merger. Over all periods, we 
find that the speed of adjustment increases for more than half of these estimates (one in short, five in 
medium, and six in the long run of the estimates become absolutely larger after the merger). These 
results imply that single-directional causality exists before and after the merger, but after the merger, 
there is a modestly more significant and rapid return to equilibrium. 
Looking at the results of Table 6, which tests the model in Equation (4), we are unable to reject 
the null hypothesis that OMX indices do not Granger-cause the NASDAQ index one year before/after 
the merger at the 5% significant level (see f−value in the Table 6). Thus, we are unable to conclude 
whether there is a positive or negative effect on the predictive power of the OMX indices on the 
NASDAQ index in the short run. In the medium run, Cop/Hel only Granger-causes the NASDAQ 
index before the merger and Sto Granger-causes the NASDAQ both before and after the merger. The 
implication is that after the merger, some OMX indices lose their predictive power on NASDAQ. In 
the long run, 5 out of 7 of the statistics of the f−test for OMX indices that Granger-cause the NASDAQ 
before the merger become insignificant after the merger. When we check the estimates of the error-
correction coefficient, except for Vil, it is not significant in the short run before the merger. After the 
merger, two coefficients become significant. In the medium term, two estimates go from insignificant 
before the merger to significant after the merger. In the long run, six out of seven estimates go from 
significant to insignificant. Furthermore, four estimates of the error-correction coefficient in the 
medium run and six in the long run become absolutely smaller after the merger. These findings show 
that (1) the relationship of OMX causing NASDAQ only exists in the relatively longer time period 
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before the merger, (2) the error−correction mechanism only exists in the short run after the merger 
and in the long run before the merger, and (3) NASDAQ index seems to return to the long-run 
equilibrium more slowly in the long run. 
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Table 5.: Linear causality tests for NASDAQ index causing OMX indices. 
Panel A: One Year Before and after Stock Exchange Merger 
    ′  ′   ′   ′   ′  f-Test 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Cop −0.450 −0.927  −0.1724 ** 0.069 *** 0.079 *** 0.032 * 0.004 −0.240 *** −0.210 ** −0.185 ** 0.027 4.07 *** 8.39 *** 
Hel −3.099 −7.597 **  −0.0007 0.661 *** 0.570 *** 0.360 *** 0.132 −0.305 *** −0.329 *** −0.216 ** −0.128 5.81 *** 5.13 *** 
Riga −0.527 −0.721  −0.0286 ** 0.047 *** 0.052 *** 0.026 −0.003 −0.072 −0.056 0.068 0.229 3.15 *** 4.11 *** 
Sto −1.709 0.601  −0.0679 ** 0.179 ** 0.225 *** 0.045 0.089 ** −0.232 ** −0.398 *** −0.080 −0.163 2.71 *** 4.94 *** 
Vil −0.189 −0.913 ** −0.0237 * −0.0751 *** 0.050 *** 0.038 *** −0.019 −0.018 * 0.194 *** 0.104 −0.101 0.141 * 4.27 *** 6.58 *** 
Tal −0.885 −1.498 **  −0.0746 *** 0.088 *** 0.059 *** 0.011 −0.008 0.153 ** 0.016 −0.058 0.132 3.55 *** 6.72 *** 
AOMX −1.365 * −2.767 ***  0.0001 0.177 *** 0.191 *** 0.091 *** 0.045 −0.251 *** −0.345 *** −0.219 ** −0.054 6.02 *** 7.35 *** 
Panel B: Three Years Before and After Stock Exchange Merger 
                 f−Test 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Cop 0.1413 −0.134 −0.0059 −0.029 *** 0.057 *** 0.071 *** 0.0126 0.012 −0.136 *** −0.212 *** −0.072 −0.059 6.07 *** 11.46 *** 
Hel 1.194 0.833 0.002 −0.023 ** 0.532 *** 0.398 *** 0.128 ** 0.061 −0.192 *** −0.243 *** −0.068 −0.062 9.72 *** 8.14 *** 
Riga 0.0046 0.134 −0.012 ** −0.012 *** 0.037 *** 0.041 *** 0.0051 0.002 0.068 * −0.038 0.073 * 0.033 3.23 *** 5.61 *** 
Sto 0.6376 0.463 0.019 0.017 0.187 *** 0.159 *** 0.029 0.046 −0.268 *** −0.306 *** −0.039 −0.159 *** 6.86 *** 6.32 *** 
Vil 0.073 −0.027 −0.013 ** −0.014 *** 0.048 *** 0.041 *** −0.017 ** −0.006 0.179 *** 0.107 *** −0.058 0.046 6.26 *** 10.58 *** 
Tal 0.261 −0.224 −0.005 −0.018 *** 0.072 *** 0.064 *** 0.004 0.003 0.165 *** 0.018 −0.004 0.091 ** 4.74 *** 9.13 *** 
AOMX 0.264 −0.223 0.012 * −0.022 ** 0.153 *** 0.131 *** 0.034 ** 0.017 −0.165 *** −0.236 *** −0.066 −0.022 10.56 *** 10.51 *** 
Panel C: Five Years Before and After Stock Exchange Merger 
                 f-Test 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Cop 0.165 0.103 −0.0002 −0.013 ** 0.042 *** 0.051 *** 0.006 0.012 ** −0.094 *** −0.158 *** −0.058 * −0.065 * 6.68 *** 10.43 *** 
Hel 1.242 * 0.151 −0.0002 −0.008 ** 0.400 *** 0.336 *** 0.069 * 0.072 * −0.147 *** −0.211 ** −0.060 * −0.061 12.79 *** 7.78 *** 
Riga 0.1703 −0.143 −0.001 −0.006 ** 0.026 *** 0.034 *** 0.004 0.003 0.041 −0.057 * 0.066 ** 0.041 2.09 *** 7.12 *** 
Sto 0.529 * 0.077 0.007 −0.006 0.149 *** 0.140 *** 0.019 0.057 *** −0.229 *** −0.281 *** −0.032 −0.159 ** 9.38 *** 7.37 *** 
Vil 0.149 −0.171 −0.003 −0.007 *** 0.033 *** 0.037 *** −0.010 * −0.004 0.165 *** 0.088 *** −0.051 * 0.0302 5.92 *** 13.86 *** 
Tal 0.132 −0.092 −0.0004 −0.005 * 0.055 *** 0.065 *** −0.001 0.002 0.157 *** 0.034 −0.005 0.037 5.28 *** 11.87 *** 
AOMX 0.434 ** 0.368 0.003 −0.008 ** 0.113 *** 0.112 *** 0.016 0.024 ** −0.114 *** −0.209 *** −0.0498 −0.054 13.4 *** 10.46 *** 
Using subsamples, namely, one, three, and five years before and after the merger of NASDAQ with OMX, we test causality between NASDAQ and OMX stock 
indices. This table shows the f-value with the null hypothesis of no causality and the coefficients of the speed of adjustment between OMX indices and the NASDAQ 
index when the NASDAQ index is regarded as an independent variable. m = n = 10. The coefficients of the first two lag terms of X  and Y  are reported as well. 
In addition, ECM is not included in the model for the one year before the sample as a result of no cointegration. *, **, and *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. Source: author’s own calculation. ∆Y  = δ + ∑ α ∆X   
 
    + ∑ β ∆Y   
 
    + γ ∙ ECM    + u  . 
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Table 6: Linear causality tests for OMX indices causing the NASDAQ index. 
Panel A: One Year Before and After Stock Exchange Merger 
    ′  ′   ′   ′   ′  f-Test 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Cop −0.427 −5.474  0.4401 −0.021 −0.077 0.007 −0.0595 −0.819 * −0.358 0.678 −0.728 1.34 0.74 
Hel −0.23 −8.512 **  0.0600 * −0.027 −0.057 0.108 −0.075 −0.140 * −0.107 0.036 −0.047 1.43 1.01 
Riga −0.678 −8.131 *  0.233 * −0.125 * −0.053 0.084 −0.1003 −0.583 * −0.885 −0.185 1.155 ** 1.07 1.49 
Sto 0.203 −6.841  0.058 −0.101 −0.015 0.03 −0.013 −0.075 −0.552 ** 0.107 −0.283 1.19 0.85 
Vil 0.639 −3.45 0.148 0.607 *** −0.100 −0.036 0.109 −0.105 1.156 ** −0.155 0.470 1.002 1.00 1.28 
Tal −0.457 −6.217  0.129 −0.102 −0.051 0.076 −0.127 −0.45 −0.473 0.082 0.515 0.79 1.63 * 
AOMX −0.511 −7.737 *  0.254 ** −0.015 0.002 0.112 −0.035 −0.578 ** −0.541 0.187 −0.126 1.53 1.36 
Panel B: Three Years Before and After Stock Exchange Merger 
    ′  ′   ′   ′   ′  f-Test 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Cop 0.1786 0.388 0.172 *** −0.069 0.029 −0.076 −0.018 −0.081 −0.694 *** −0.053 0.3754 −0.241 2.35 *** 1.29 
Hel 1.125 0.732 0.0161 0.001 0.024 −0.065 −0.004 −0.115 ** −0.096 ** 0.002 0.0343 0.035 2.32 *** 1.48 
Riga 0.8393 1.642 0.033 * −0.034 −0.052 −0.062 −0.023 −0.099 ** −0.0929 −0.307 −0.0093 0.229 1.27 1.40 
Sto 1.4674 1.934 0.045 *** 0.088 *** −0.027 −0.018 −0.037 −0.078 −0.0908 −0.204 0.0626 -0.076 2.07 ** 1.98 ** 
Vil 0.596 0.932 0.042 −0.014 −0.044 0.001 0.303 −0.107 ** −0.501 ** −0.128 0.303 0.373 1.22 0.83 
Tal −0.047 1.145 0.012 0.018 −0.048 −0.045 −0.024 −0.100 ** −0.095 −0.153 0.064 0.178 1.13 1.31 
AOMX 0.638 0.782 0.063 *** 0.008 0.024 −0.044 −0.001 −0.106 * −0.346 ** −0.084 0.1601 0.117 2.71 *** 1.60 * 
Panel C: Five Years Before and After Stock Exchange Merger 
    ′  ′   ′   ′   ′  f−Test 
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Cop 1.471 ** 0.924 0.060 ** −0.017 0.008 −0.054 −0.022 −0.036 −0.480 ** −0.081 0.483 ** −0.273 2.59 *** 0.90 
Hel 1.036 1.227 0.009 *** −0.002 0.009 −0.056 −0.013 −0.100 ** −0.063 * 0.005 0.043 0.067 2.29 *** 1.58 * 
Riga 1.073 0.974 0.028 *** −0.028 −0.029 −0.052 * −0.008 −0.060 * −0.062 −0.214 −0.0201 0.350 * 1.74 * 1.36 
Sto 1.533 ** 1.202 0.031 *** 0.016 −0.024 −0.019 −0.033 −0.0597 −0.015 −0.128 0.078 0.009 1.97 ** 1.12 
Vil 0.994 0.851 0.017 −0.007 −0.027 −0.067 ** −0.0001 −0.082 ** −0.374 ** 0.313 0.277 0.32003 1.30 0.70 
Tal 1.338 * 0.755 0.019 *** −0.005 −0.024 −0.058 * −0.013 −0.069 ** −0.077 0.034 0.068 0.094 2.06 ** 0.75 
AOMX 1.616 ** 1.256 0.025 *** −0.005 0.004 −0.044 −0.019 −0.087 ** −0.198 * −0.044 0.209 * 0.178 2.27 *** 1.31 
Using subsamples, namely, one, three, and five years before and after the merger of NASDAQ with OMX, we test causality between NASDAQ and OMX stock 
indices. This table shows the f−value with the null hypothesis of no causality and the coefficients of the speed of adjustment between OMX indices and the NASDAQ 
index when the NASDAQ index is regarded as a dependent variable. m = n = 10. The coefficients of the first two lag terms of    and    are reported as well. In 
addition,     is not included in the model for the one year before the sample as a result of no cointegration. *, **, and *** denote the significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. Source: author’s own calculation. ∆X  = δ + ∑ α′ ∆X        + ∑ β′ ∆Y        + γ′ ∙ ECM    + u  . 
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4.3. Nonlinear Causality 
To test the existence of strictly nonlinear causal relationships between the NASDAQ and OMX 
indices, we employed the nonlinear nonparametric causality test with m = 1, L  =  L  = 10, e = 1.5. 
Table 7 shows the results of the nonlinear causality before and after the merger. We first look into the 
results of Panel A, which is based on the null hypothesis that NASDAQ does not nonlinearly cause 
OMX. We find only one rejection of noncausality at the 5% level before the merger in the short, 
medium, and long runs, while after the merger, NASDAQ nonlinear noncausality is never rejected 
at the 5% level in the short run. In the medium and long run, it is rejected three times each. In Panel 
B, we consider the opposite directional nonlinear causality between NASDAQ and OMX. As in Panel 
A, the number of significant rejections at or above the 5% level after the merger diminish in the short 
run but increase in the medium and long runs. These findings imply that the causality between 
NASDAQ and OMX becomes more complex after the merger in the medium and long runs. 
Table 7. Nonlinear causality tests using the daily price index of OMX and NASDAQ. 
Panel A 
Pr ‖y 
  − y 
 ‖ < e  y    
  
− y    
  
  < e,  x    
   − x    
     < e  = Pr ‖y 
  − y 
 ‖ < e  y    
  
− y    
  
  < e  
  1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 
  Before After Before After Before After 
Dependent  
Variables 
       
 Cop 0.1649 0.2266 0.4239 0.0704 * 0.1512 0.0604 * 
 Hel 0.3267 0.4178 0.1305 0.0025 *** 0.1941 0.0305 ** 
 Riga 0.4869 0.0685 * 0.2962 0.3035 0.0271 ** 0.3104 
 Sto 0.0636 * 0.4741 0.0336 ** 0.0000 *** 0.0846 * 0.0000 *** 
 Vil 0.325 0.1763 0.1538 0.2329 0.1435 0.4721 
 Tal 0.0418 ** 0.1263 0.0873 * 0.2892 0.2878 0.2008 
 AOMX 0.2191 0.3429 0.1434 0.0218 ** 0.4761 0.0137 ** 
Panel B 
Pr ‖x 
  − x 
 ‖ < e  x    
   − x    
     < e,  y    
  
− y    
  
  < e  = Pr ‖x 
  − x 
 ‖ < e  x    
   − x    
     < e  
  1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 
  Before After Before After Before After 
Independent  
Variables 
   
 Cop 0.0011 *** 0.4368 0.1107 0.0009 *** 0.4135 0.0011 *** 
 Hel 0.1193 0.0293 ** 0.1146 0.0010 *** 0.1699 0.0004 *** 
 Riga 0.0292 ** 0.3557 0.0654 * 0.1902 0.0369 ** 0.1796 
 Sto 0.2275 0.4241 0.0126 ** 0.0000 *** 0.1231 0.0000 *** 
 Vil 0.3818 0.3097 0.2066 0.3410 0.0048 *** 0.0266 ** 
 Tal 0.2037 0.0842 * 0.0049 *** 0.2266 0.1196 0.4031 
 AOMX 0.2269 0.3515 0.0208 ** 0.0101 ** 0.4587 0.0001 *** 
Using the residuals from Tables 5 and 6, we test causality between NASDAQ and OMX stock indices. 
This table shows p−values with the null hypothesis of no nonlinear causality between the Nordic 
stock indices and the NASDAQ index when the NASDAQ index is regarded as a dependent variable 
and an independent variable separately. m = 1, L  =  L  = 10, e = 1.5 . *, **, and *** denote the 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Source: author’s own calculation, using C 
programs software. 
Combining the results of linear and nonlinear causality, we find that (1) before the merger, 
NASDAQ and OMX have bidirectional causal relations in the long run and unidirectional relations 
in the short run, and these relations are primarily linear. (2) After the merger, the error-correction 
mechanism pushing OMX back to long−run equilibrium works better and more significantly; it does 
not work for NASDAQ. (3) After the merger in the medium and long runs, the causal relation of OMX 
causing NASDAQ becomes nonlinear. These results hint that NASDAQ and OMX operated 
independently before the merger. However, after the merger, NASDAQ and OMX operate as a group 
or a team. NASDAQ performs like a leader, and OMX performs like a follower. The predictive power 
of OMX on NASDAQ becomes weaker and nonlinear after the merger. Additionally, OMX, instead 
of NASDAQ, becomes the one who is responsible for adjusting and returning to the long equilibrium. 
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4.4. Mean−Variance and Mean Omega Analysis 
We now turn to the question of whether and how the performance of the indices changes after 
the merger. Table 8 presents the basic statistics and Omega ratios for the daily stock excess returns of 
the stock indices from Euronext OMX in the short, medium, and long runs. Except for Tal and 
NASDAQ in the medium term, we find that the mean returns before the merger are higher than those 
after the merger. However, except for Vil in the short/long run, none of the coefficients are significant 
at the 5% level or better. Thus, we conclude (1) that there is no premerger or postmerger 
outperformance. On the other hand, the standard deviations of each index are larger after the merger. 
Among them, the F−statistics of the return between pre− and postmerger are all significant at the 1% 
significance level. This result infers that investors suffer more volatility after the merger when they 
invest in the OMX markets. All the Omega ratios with the threshold return of 0.00% are larger in the 
premerger period, showing a lower probability of earning positive profits after the merger. These 
results are consistent across the different time periods included in the sample. When we set the 
threshold return, −0.50%, the Omega ratios of the OMX and NASDAQ indices after the merger are 
much smaller than they are before the merger. However, when we set the threshold return relatively 
higher, at 0.50%, all Omega ratios are higher in the postmerger period except Vil in the long run. 
These findings imply that it is easier for investors to earn positive profits or control losses before the 
merger, but investors enjoy a higher probability of achieving a relatively high return after the merger. 
According to the three points above, we conclude that there is no existence of significant change in 
the mean of performance and that risk-averters prefer to invest before the merger to control risk while 
risk-seekers prefer to invest after the merger to earn a higher return. 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of the returns for the MV criterion and Omega ratio. 
1 Year        
Variable 
Mean StdDev t-Test Omega (%) Omega (%) Omega (%) 
(%) (%) F-Test r = 0.0% r = −0.5% r = 0.5% 
Cop  
Before −0.05 1.34 1.04 89.89 234.47 30.47 
After  −0.27 2.78 4.34 *** 75.53 126.38 45.38 
Hel 
Before −0.04 1.42 1.49 91.32 228.64 35.23 
After  −0.36 2.69 3.60 *** 69.16 115.72 41.88 
Riga 
Before −0.09 1.28 1.96 * 79.19 261.18 23.47 
After  −0.43 2.13 2.76 *** 55.37 110.06 28.51 
Sto 
Before −0.09 1.45 0.43 84.43 203.10 33.49 
After  −0.19 2.83 3.83 *** 83.12 135.94 51.45 
Vil 
Before −0.03 1.08 2.77 *** 91.01 313.01 21.84 
After  −0.51 2.22 4.20 *** 47.62 99.37 23.43 
Tal 
Before −0.14 1.17 1.70 * 69.66 236.48 20.09 
After  −0.41 2 2.94 *** 54.86 113.69 27.29 
AOMX 
Before −0.08 0.93 1.93 * 78.97 316.27 14.40 
After  −0.36 1.92 4.29 *** 57.59 123.40 27.56 
NASDAQ 
Before −0.01 1.25 1.08 98.93 259.56 33.58 
After  −0.24 2.92 5.45 *** 79.46 128.01 49.27 
3 Year        
Variable 
Mean StdDev t-Test Omega (%) Omega (%) Omega (%) 
(%) (%) F-Test r = 0.0% r = −0.5% r = 0.5% 
Cop  
Before 0.04 1.09 0.29 110.59 353.97 29.79 
After  0.02 1.97 3.26 *** 102.25 211.69 49.12 
Hel 
Before 0.05 1.15 0.58 112.29 351.83 33.15 
After  0.00 2.04 3.13 *** 99.33 194.90 50.16 
Riga 
Before 0.04 1.12 0.75 111.32 403.62 30.40 
After  −0.02 1.95 3.03 *** 96.49 197.98 47.35 
Sto 
Before 0.03 1.20 0.06 107.49 318.49 33.07 
After  0.02 2.01 2.79 *** 103.70 210.20 51.28 
Vil 
Before 0.05 1.05 0.82 113.19 401.11 28.71 
After  −0.02 1.74 2.73 *** 96.52 237.63 38.91 
Tal 
Before 0.024 0.96 −0.03 108.67 462.05 21.78 
After  0.026 1.74 3.29 *** 104.45 238.01 46.26 
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AOMX 
Before 0.04 0.73 0.57 106.73 465.4 21.67 
After  0.00 1.42 3.80 *** 100.63 270.29 36.12 
NASDAQ 
Before 0.02 1.03 −0.08 106.07 366.82 28.53 
After  0.03 2.03 3.89 *** 104.47 209.82 49.96 
5 year        
Variable 
Mean StdDev t-Test Omega (%) Omega (%) Omega (%) 
(%) (%) F-Test r = 0.0% r = −0.5% r = 0.5% 
Cop  
Before 0.07 1.03 0.86 120.81 419.47 31.82 
After  0.02 1.72 2.78 *** 103.73 237.24 44.42 
Hel 
Before 0.07 1.09 1.29 120.31 397.98 33.90 
After  −0.01 1.95 3.21 *** 98.34 197.97 48.61 
Riga 
Before 0.09 1.03 1.96 * 128.60 517.14 31.93 
After  −0.02 1.61 2.41 *** 95.66 234.75 38.73 
Sto 
Before 0.06 0.04 0.64 115.11 344.07 36.18 
After  0.02 0.05 2.41 *** 103.22 220.96 47.66 
Vil 
Before 0.14 1.02 2.98 *** 148.06 539.84 36.49 
After  −0.02 1.51 2.21 *** 95.42 275.33 32.47 
Tal 
Before 0.10 0.98 1.53 136.38 544.33 29.91 
After  0.02 1.54 2.48 *** 103.13 266.04 40.24 
AOMX 
Before 0.09 0.67 2.10 ** 145.05 858.89 16.05 
After  0.00 1.26 3.55 *** 100.04 303.93 31.19 
NASDAQ 
Before 0.05 1.11 0.35 112.76 353.28 34.32 
After  0.03 1.78 2.56 *** 104.94 232.67 45.46 
Using subsamples, namely, one/three/five years before and after the merger of NASDAQ with OMX, 
we report the mean-variance of the daily return of the stock index. This table shows the results of the 
t-test and the f-test with the null hypothesis that the mean and volatility of the stock index are different 
pre- and postmerger. Omega ratios with different returns, i.e., 0.00%, −0.50%, 0.50%, are shown as 
well. * and *** denote the significance at 10% and 1% levels, respectively. Source: author’s own 
calculation. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates how the stock exchange merger of NASDAQ with OMX affects the 
comovement between the stock markets of OMX and NASDAQ and briefly examines whether the 
merger reduces investor utility by reducing diversification opportunities. 
Some players in the market may not realize that stock exchanges were created like mutual 
organizations and owned by its member stockbrokers, but some players in the markets have 
demutualized and their members sell their shares in an initial public offering. Actually, stock 
exchanges are run like normal private companies and try to increase the wealth of the shareholders 
as much as possible. Thus, the principal question is, do they care about the sustainable development 
of investments, allowing investors to diversify their investments and reduce the risk of their 
investments? In this regard, we are interested in whether it is necessary to set up some national 
policies and international treaties for sustainable development and to implement and monitor 
policies for the sustainable development of stock markets. 
We find that the comovement between indices in the OMX and NASDAQ indices adjusts due to 
the merger. The cointegration test shows that the long-run common trend exists one year after the 
merger but not one year before the merger, implying that the merger improves the integration of the 
two stock exchanges, which, in turn, implies that the merger of NASDAQ and OMX becomes more 
sustainable. The results are congruent with Choudhry et al. [17], Kearney and Lucey [18], and Chen 
et al. [19], in that cointegrated stock markets weaken the benefits of international portfolio 
diversification in the long run. 
Using Granger causality with ECM, we find that the error-correction mechanism for NASDAQ 
causing OMX indices becomes significant after the merger, providing further evidence of the 
improvement of integration after the merger. However, the causal relation from OMX to NASDAQ 
becomes insignificant and/or nonlinear after the merger. These findings show that the relationship 
between the two exchanges changes after the merger. 
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Finally, our study shows that the volatility of stock returns seems to be higher, with no clear rise 
of mean after the merger. In addition, the probability that a low threshold return will be achieved 
becomes lower after the merger, implying that it is difficult for investors to control risk as a result of 
the decreased diversification opportunities after the merger; however, the probability of achieving a 
relatively high target return becomes higher. 
Our finding confirms that the merger increases in the long−run comovement between each pair 
of indices in Nordic and Baltic stock markets, implying that the merger of NASDAQ and OMX 
reduced the diversification possibilities for investors in stock markets and inferring that it is 
important to implement national policies and international treaties for the sustainable development 
of financial markets. As already mentioned, Otchere and Abukari [4] examined whether stock 
exchange mergers could increase efficiency or if these stock exchanges mergers are only a question 
of market power, finding that the industry’s concentration levels have not significantly increased and 
the concentration levels do not influence the exchanges’ profitability in the postmerger period. Our 
investigation complements the Otchere and Abukari [4] findings, describing that stock exchange 
mergers do not benefit stock market investors in terms of portfolio diversion. 
One limitation of our study is that we have not compared other mergers of stock exchanges that 
have occurred in history. An extension of our study could compare other mergers of stock exchanges 
that have occurred in history to check whether the effects of other mergers are the same as those in 
our study and whether the effects have changed from time to time. Another limitation of our study 
is that we have not explored, at the same time, whether the wealth of Euronext shareholders increased 
after the merger with OMX. An extension of our study could also study the change in the wealth of 
the shareholders after the mergers. 
This paper investigates the stock exchange merger of NASDAQ with OMX and examines the 
sustainability of co-movement between the stock markets of OMX and NASDAQ, that could affect 
investors’ profit and decision making in their investment, changing their trading strategies, and could 
affect market efficiency and create arbitrage opportunity, anomaly, and additional risk. Thus, 
extension of our paper could include studying co-movement of other series [55,58–71], co-movement 
of using different trading strategies [47,72–75], co-movement of making use of different anomalies 
[76–78], co-movement of investing in different markets [60,64,79–82], sustainability of making use of 
different market conditions [66,83], and co-movement in different types of risk [84–97]. To do so, we 
have to apply some advanced statistics, see, for example, Bai, et al., [43–46], Hui, et al. [87], Ng, et al. 
[88], and Guo, et al. [89–91]. 
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